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STATE EVIDENTIARY RULES PROHIBITING IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN
WITNESS MUST YIELD TO A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A
FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL
Welcome v. Vincent
Pursuant to traditional common law principles, a party is pro-
hibited from attacking the credibility of his own witness.' In recent
years, however, this longstanding evidentiary maxim has been ques-
tioned on both utilitarian and constitutional grounds.3 Accordingly,
I The rule of evidence which prohibits a party from impeaching his own witnesses on the
theory that such party "vouches" for the credibility of those witnesses is of uncertain origin.
One theory advanced in explanation of the rule is that it stemmed from the decisory oath of
the Roman law, which prohibited a party who called a witness from later claiming that the
witness was incompetent when such witness was subsequently called by the opponent. An-
other theory holds that the rule arose out of the trial by compurgation prevalent in the Middle
Ages. Under that system of trial, the parties to a dispute enlisted "oath-helpers" who swore
to the veracity of the party calling them as a witness. See generally 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 896-899 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New
Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 76-80 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]. A third
explanation of the rule is based upon transition from the inquisitorial method of trial to the
adversary system. See generally id. at 70-72; Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA.
L. REv. 996 (1963).
2 Professor Wigmore has contended that since the rule proscribing impeachment of one's
own witness is no longer based upon the idea that a party is bound by the witness' statements
or that he guarantees his witness' credibility, the only possible rationale for the rule is the
prevention of coercion of the witness. Professor Wigrore found little merit in this explana-
tion, however, since the rule serves only to protect the dishonest witness and has almost no
effect upon those who testify truthfully. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 897-899 (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1970).
According to Dean Ladd, since a party no longer has complete choice as to whom he calls
as witnesses, there is no rational basis for assuming that he vouches for those whom he does
call. Although he recognized that the concept of identifying a witness with a party stems from
the adversary system, Dean Ladd argued that it is unreasonable to expect "a party to predict
with accuracy what [the witness'] testimony will be in advance. . . ..." Ladd, supra note 1,
at 80.
Finally, Professor Morgan has concluded that since witnesses today usually testify to the
facts in dispute and not to the veracity of the parties, a rule prohibiting a party from impeach-
ing his own witness has no place in the modem adversary system. According to Professor
Morgan, the many attempts to modify the rule illustrate that it no longer serves a useful
purpose. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 70, 71 (1961).
3 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right of cross-examination is "one of
the safeguards essential to a fair trial." Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931). In
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the "sixth amend-
ment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right
and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." See also In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Furthermore, the Pointer Court stated that the right of confrontation
includes the right to cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing. 380 U.S. at 406. In
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), the Court extended the Pointer decision, holding that
even where the defendant does not avail himself of the right to cross-examine a witness at a
preliminary hearing, he does not waive the right to confront the witness at trial. Id. at 725.
Further protection was afforded criminal defendants when the Court held, in Bruton v.
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while this traditional "voucher" rule has been adopted by most
jurisdictions, it gradually has been modified by various judicially
created exceptions.4 Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit, in
Welcome v. Vincent,5 held that a state trial court's refusal to allow
a defendant to question his own witness concerning the latter's prior
confession to the crime for which the defendant was being tried, to
impeach the witness' credibility, constituted a denial of the defen-
dant's right to a fundamentally fair trial and thereby violated the
fourteenth amendment.'
Defendant Welcome had been convicted of two murders com-
mitted during the course of an armed robbery. Prior to Welcome's
indictment, another individual, Albert Cunningham, had been in-
dicted and tried for the murders. At Cunningham's trial, New York
police detectives testified concerning admissions made to them by
Cunningham.7 Although a written confession was admitted into evi-
dence, Cunningham had not signed it, nor had he sworn to his oral
statements.8 In fact, prior to his trial, he had repudiated the confes-
sion on the ground that it had been elicited by coercive techniques?
Nevertheless, Cunningham's statements were found to have been
made voluntarily and were held admissible at trial.'0 Thereafter,
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that where a confession implicating one defendant and
made by a codefendant who does not take the stand is admitted into evidence, instructions
to the jury to disregard the confession in relation to the nontestifying defendant are not
sufficient to protect that defendant from resulting prejudice and are not a "substitute for
[defendant's] constitutional right of cross-examination." Id. at 137.
Despite the criticism directed at the "voucher" rule most jurisdictions have adopted it
but have qualified its applicability. Where a witness has made a prior inconsistent statement,
for instance, many courts will allow impeachment by the party calling the witness if it can
be shown that the witness' testimony is surprising and damaging to that party. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d
477 (9th Cir. 1965); Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1938). In order to be
damaging, the testimony must directly contradict a prior statement of the witness. The courts
will not allow impeachment solely on the basis of a denial or lack of recollection on the part
of the witness. See, e.g., Webb v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1958); State v. Perillo,
18 N.J. Super. 549, 87 A.2d 727 (1950); People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 351 N.E.2d 675,
386 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976). See generally 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 904-905 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970); Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REV. 996 (1963).
549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977), rev'g 418 F. Supp. 1088
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
549 F.2d at 858-59.
Id. at 854-55. According to the detectives, Cunningham admitted that on the day of
the crime he and three other men-Branch, Green and an unidentified person-had driven
to the Bronx; the other individuals had entered the Katz' realty office, while Cunningham
remained on the staircase of the building. Cunningham claimed that he heard shots and ran
away. Id. at 854.
418 F. Supp. at 1090.
549 F.2d at 854.
I" Id. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Supreme Court held that where a
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despite the existence of these inculpatory statements, the charges
against Cunningham were dropped during his trial."
Welcome and two codefendants subsequently were indicted and
brought to trial in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County.
Called as a witness by Welcome, Cunningham offered testimony
upon direct examination which was consistent with his earlier ad-
missions to the police. 2 Upon cross-examination by the state, how-
ever, Cunningham denied having participated in the crime, claim-
ing he had mistakenly believed on direct examination that defense
counsel had been inquiring about the content of his prior
"confession" to the police. 3 Thereafter, defense counsel attempted
to impeach Cunningham by questioning him as to his "confes-
sion."' 4 The trial court disallowed this line of questioning, reason-
defendant claims that a confession was made involuntarily, the confession may not be admit-
ted against the defendant at trial unless it has been "fairly determined to be voluntary." Id.
at 395-96. Subsequently, in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d
838 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals held that before the prosecution may use a
defendant's out-of-court statement at trial, the defendant must be given an opportunity to
have the statement suppressed at an evidentiary hearing. If the court is not convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of the voluntariness of the defendant's statement, it may not be used
against him at trial. If, on the other hand, it is established that the statement is voluntary
beyond a reasonable doubt, the statement is admissible at trial. Under New York law, how-
ever, a defendant is given a second chance to argue at trial that the statement was not made
voluntarily. N.Y. CR|M. PROC. LAW § 710.70(3) (McKinney 1971). See W. RICHARDSON,
EVIDENCE § 550 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
" 549 F.2d at 855. Subsequently, at Welcome's trial, the Bronx District Attorney ap-
peared and informed the court of his belief that Cunningham's confession was unreliable. He
indicated that Cunningham, a drug addict suffering from withdrawal symptoms, "would have
admitted anything." Id. Additionally, the prosecutor pointed out that a lie detector test
suggested that Cunningham had not been implicated in the crime. The district attorney also
asserted that it would have been impossible for Branch and Green, the two persons named
by Cunningham, to have committed the robbery and murders, since one was in jail and the
other was out of the state at the time. Id. Moreover, the district attorney noted that Cun-
ningham had failed to identify the date of the crime, the building in which the crime took
place, and the fourth participant in the crime. Finally, the prosecutor claimed that Cun-
ningham's statements were not made against his penal interest. 418 F. Supp. at 1092-93.
Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit expressed doubt as to the district attorney's
claims that the statements were unreliable. The court pointed out that Cunningham had
directed the police to the scene of the crime on two occasions, had indicated his awareness of
the date of the crime, and had known the number of participants in the crime. In addition,
the Second Circuit found that Cunningham's statements were against his penal interest, since
they implicated him in an armed robbery and two murders. 549 F.2d at 858 n.4.
12 See note 14 infra.
, 549 F.2d at 856. See note 14 infra.
" 549 F.2d at 856. Welcome's attorney on direct examination had attempted to question
Cunningham about his conversations with the detectives and the assistant district attorney.
The trial judge sustained the prosecutor's objection to-this line of questioning, and allowed
defense counsel to interrogate Cunningham only about the roles played by him and others in
the murders. 418 F. Supp. at 1090-91. Cunningham then testified that he, Branch and Green
drove to the Bronx on the date of the murders, armed with a shotgun and pistols, and robbed
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ing that Cunningham was not technically an adverse witness,
since Cunningham's testimony had not incriminated Welcome.,5
Following his conviction, Welcome pursued the available avenues of
appellate review, to no avail.16 Thereafter, Welcome filed a petition
for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. 7 The district court
held that Welcome had not been deprived of his right to a fair trial
by virtue of the trial court's refusal to allow impeachment of the
witness Cunningham. 8 In holding that defendant had been denied
a fair trial as a result of the state trial court's adherence to the
traditional rule prohibiting impeachment of one's own witness, 9 the
Second Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Oakes, relied
heavily upon the Supreme Court decision in Chambers v. Missis-
sippi.2° In Chambers, the defendant had introduced into evidence
the sworn out-of-court confession of his witness, McDonald.
the Katz brothers' realty office. On cross-examination, however, Cunningham denied robbing
the Katz' office, claiming that he had "misunderstood defense counsel and thought his
questions referred to the confession . . . ." Id. at 1091.
S 418 F. Supp. at 1091. Defense counsel argued that since Cunningham had mentioned
the confession in response to cross-examination by the prosecutor, the prosecution had
"opened the door" to the defense's questions aimed at establishing that Cunningham's prior
oral statements "were inconsistent with the answers given on cross-examination." Id. The
prosecutor argued in sidebar discussion that he had not elicited the reference to the
"confession" from Cunningham, and the trial judge indicated that, had the prosecutor moved
to strike the reference to the confession, the motion would have been granted. Id. at n.8.
" Defendant's conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in People v. Welcome, 39 App. Div. 2d 841, 331 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1st
Dep't 1972) (mem.). After Judge Burke initially denied leave to appeal to the New York Court
of Appeals, defendant was granted leave by Chief Judge Breitel. 549 F.2d at 854. In the
meantime, defendant moved, pursuant to N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 440.10(1)(g), (h) (McKin-
ney 1971), for a new trial and vacatur of his conviction on the ground that a "prosecution
witness had recanted his trial testimony and admitted perjuring himself." 549 F.2d at 854.
The Supreme Court, Bronx County, denied the motion and the appellate division affirmed
the denial without opinion. People v. Welcome, 46 App. Div. 2d 860, 361 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st
Dep't 1974) (mem.). Consolidating the direct appeal and the appeal from the denial of the
motion for a new trial, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Welcome, 37 N.Y.2d 811,
338 N.E.2d 328, 375 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1975) (per curiam), dismissed the direct appeal and
affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial.
"' 418 F. Supp. at 1089. The defendant based his habeas corpus action upon two grounds.
First, he claimed that the trial court's refusal to allow him to cross-examine Cunningham
about the latter's prior statement to the police deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Second, the defendant
contended that he had also been deprived of his due process right to a fair trial as a result of
perjured testimony given by a prosecution witness. Id. at 1091-93.
" Id. at 1094.
" The Second Circuit found it unnecessary to consider Welcome's claim that he had been
denied a fair trial due to perjured testimony offered by a prosecution witness, since it found
grounds for reversal in the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to cross-examine Cun-
ningham as to his confession. 549 F.2d at 856. See note 17 supra.
410 U.S. 284 (1973), rev'g Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) (per curiam).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
On cross-examination, McDonald repudiated the confession.
When defense counsel attempted to question McDonald regarding
the confession and repudiation, the trial court ruled that McDonald
could not be classified as an adverse witness and therefore was not
subject to impeachment by the defendant. 2' This ruling, coupled
with the trial court's subsequent exclusion, as inadmissible hearsay,
of the testimony of three witnesses to whom McDonald had con-
fessed,2 2 led the Supreme Court to conclude that defendant Cham-
bers had been denied "a trial in accord with traditional and funda-
mental standards of due process. ' 2 In view of the limitation of the
Chambers holding to the facts therein presented, 24 the Welcome
court recognized that it was not bound by that decision in resolving
the present case.25 Due to the additional factor of the hearsay exclu-
sion in Chambers, the Supreme Court, unlike the Second Circuit,
had not been called upon to determine "whether a significant re-
striction on a defendant's examination of a witness who has con-
fessed to the crime is alone enough to deny the defendant a fair
trial. ' 2 Nevertheless, in holding that the imposition of such a re-
striction may in itself result in the denial of a fair trial, Judge Oakes
pointed to the emphasis in Chambers on a defendant's right to
cross-examine witnesses and the importance of that right in ensur-
ing a fair trial.27 Examining the factual setting of both Welcome and
Chambers, the Second Circuit found a comparable degree of preju-
dice to each defendant stemming from the trial court's rigid applica-
11 410 U.S. at 291. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court had upheld the trial court's
ruling on the ground that "'McDonald's testimony was not adverse to appellant' because
'[nowhere did he point the finger at Chambers.'" Id. at 292 (quoting Chambers v. State,
252 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971) (per curiam)).
22 410 U.S. at 292-93. The Chambers Court found that the excluded statements appeared
trustworthy and that their admission was critical to the defendant's case. Id. at 302. Excep-
tions to the hearsay rule traditionally are based upon a showing that the statements are
trustworthy and that there is some necessity for their admission into evidence. 5 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 (3d ed. 1940). For a discussion of the hearsay rule and its connection
to the right of confrontation, see id. §§ 1395-1400; Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A
Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFSTA L. REV. 32 (1973).
1 410 U.S. at 302.
24 Id. at 302-03.
2 549 F.2d at 857.
Id. Commenting on the apparent emphasis in the Chambers opinion, Judge Oakes
noted that, in light of that decision,
[t]he right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure.
It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the
"accuracy of the truth-determining process." . . -It is, indeed, "an essential and
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitu-
tional goal."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
21 549 F.2d at 857.
19781
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tion of the rule proscribing impeachment of one's own witness.
Brushing aside the state trial court's reliance upon Cunningham's
status as a nonadverse witness,29 the Welcome court pointed to the
rejection in Chambers of such a technical ground for denying a
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses who give testimony
damaging to him.30 According to Judge Oakes, "Chambers makes
clear that [defendant] did not give up his due process right to
examine Cunningham thoroughly . . . by calling Cunningham to
the witness stand." 3'
The Second Circuit went on to reject the district court's at-
tempt to distinguish the instant case from Chambers. The district
court had determined that Cunningham's confession appeared un-
reliable, and contrasted this with the situation in Chambers, where
a denial of due process had been found "because the confession and
related hearsay statements. . . bore 'persuasive indications' of reli-
ability and 'trustworthiness.' ",32 Hesitant to characterize Cun-
ningham's confession as unreliable, 33 and uncertain whether the
11 Id. The Second Circuit observed that the inability of Welcome to present Cun-
ningham's confession to the jury deprived the jury of "information bearing directly on the
key decision . . . whether to believe Cunningham's initial admission of guilt, which, if true,
would have exonerated [Welcome]." Id. The court noted similarity to the Chambers situa-
tion "where 'all that remained from [the witness'] testimony was a single written confession
countered by an arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers' defense was far less persuasive
than it might have been had he been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's statements
to cross-examination .... '" Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
(1973)).
" 549 F.2d at 858.
Id. In Chambers, the Supreme Court explained:
The availability of the right to confront and to cross-examine those who give dam-
aging testimony against the accused has never been held to depend on whether the
witness was initially put on the stand by the accused or by the State. We reject
the notion that a right of such substance in the criminal process may be governed
by that technicality or by any narrow and unrealistic definition of the word
"against."
410 U.S. at 297-98.
11 549 F.2d at 858.
31 Id. The district court concluded that the Supreme Court in Chambers had found a
denial of the defendant's right to "'a [fair] trial in accord with traditional and fundamental
standards of due process,' because the [combination of all the trial court's rulings] made
Chambers' defense 'far less persuasive' than it would have been had his opportunity to
present evidence not been restricted." 418 F. Supp. at 1092 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302 (1973)). According to the Welcome district
court, the finding of a denial of due process in Chambers was based largely upon the exclusion
of hearsay statements which bore persuasive indications of reliability. Id. at 1092. In analyz-
ing the situation in Welcome, the district court did not find that Cunningham's prior state-
ments to the police were persuasively trustworthy and held, therefore, that the court's refusal
to allow cross-examination of Cunningham as to his confession did not damage Welcome's
defense "to such an extent as to deny him a fundamentally fair trial." Id. at 1093.
1 See 549 F.2d at 858.
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Supreme Court in Chambers had even considered the confession's
trustworthiness, the Welcome court concluded that the witness'
statement need not be so reliable as to support a conviction in order
to be admissible for impeachment purposes .3 Nonetheless, Judge
Oakes emphasized that the Welcome holding applies only to situa-
tions where a witness on the stand has made a prior confession
which has some semblance of reliability and which, if true, would
exculpate the defendant."
The decision of the Second Circuit in Welcome appears neces-
sary to effectuate the constitutionally guaranteed right to a funda-
mentally fair trial. The Welcome court, as have other courts in the
years since Chambers, focused upon whether the prior statement of
the witness actually exculpated the defendant, rather than whether
it merely incriminated the witness.38 Such an approach recognizes
that the retraction of an exculpatory statement may be as damaging
to the accused's case as is a direct incrimination of the defendant
by the witness. The damaging nature of the retraction is the factor
giving rise to the defendant's right of cross-examination,37 a right
which should not be lost in a technical and often illusory distinction
based upon whether the defense or the prosecution originally called
the witness. Moreover, by requiring only that the confession have
Id. at 859.
Id. at 858-59.
' In light of Chambers, a number of courts have determined that the exclusion of evi-
dence may not form the basis of an unfair-trial claim unless the evidence excluded is exculpa-
tory as to the defendant. In Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 893 (1977), the Fifth Circuit found that the excluded evidence did not sufficiently
exculpate the defendant to warrant finding the denial of a fair trial. Id. at 92. Subsequently,
in United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1976), the same court held that there was
no showing of a denial of a fair trial where the prior statements of the witness which were
excluded were not necessarily exculpatory, but rather might only have proved that the wit-
ness and the defendant were accomplices. Id. at 841. In Commonwealth v. Gee, 354 A.2d 875
(Pa. 1976), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, relying on Chambers, recognized that "in
some circumstances the strict application of a state's voucher rule to prevent a defendant
from cross-examining or contradicting a witness he himself has called can be a denial of his
right to due process of law." Id. at 881. Nevertheless, the Gee court held that since the
statements of certain eyewitnesses to the crime did not directly exculpate the defendant and
were in fact collateral to the issue of defendant's guilt, due process did not require that
defense counsel be allowed to question these eyewitnesses as to those statements. Id. at 883.
In a case involving the exclusion of hearsay statements of the defendant's two brothers which
were self-inculpatory, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held that there
had been no denial of due process. State v. Sease, 138 N.J. Super. 80, 350 A.2d 262 (App.
Div. 1975) (per curiam). In so holding, the court noted that since the crime could have been
perpetrated by more than one person, the statements excluded were not necessarily exculpa-
tory as to the defendant. Id. at 83, 350 A.2d at 264.
549 F.2d at 858-59.
See 410 U.S. at 298-99; note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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"some semblance of reliability"39 in order to trigger the defendant's
right of confrontation, instead of focusing upon the inaccuracies in
Cunningham's statement, the Second Circuit appears to have
adopted a more cogent position than that of the district court." In
order to ensure a defendant a fair trial, it would seem essential that
all evidence which is exculpatory as to the defendant, including
confessions by others, be presented to the jury for its evaluation.',
Although it based its holding upon the due process right to a
fair trial, 2 rather than upon the defendant's right to confront wit-
549 F.2d at 859.
Not only did the Second Circuit skeptically view the district court's contention that
Cunningham's confession did not meet the test of reliability required under Chambers, but
it was of the opinion that Chambers required "persuasive indications" of trustworthiness and
reliability only in relation to the admission of hearsay evidence and not where a defendant
seeks to cross-examine a witness as to prior exculpatory statements. Id. at 858. See text
accompanying notes 29-31 supra. Since the witness is on the stand and can be questioned as
to his prior statement, it is submitted that reliability is not an issue in determining whether
to prohibit the defendant from impeaching a witness called by him. Rather, it is only in
relation to hearsay testimony, where the witnesses are not available to be questioned, that
reliability is a factor that should be considered. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970).
" See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Maness v. Wainwright, 512
F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 893 (1977).
In the course of its opinion, the Welcome court, as had the Chambers Court before it,
disclaimed any intention to constitutionalize the law of evidence. See Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Welcome v. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853, 859 (1977). In this regard,
the Chambers Court stated that:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor
does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the
States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules
and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstan-
ces of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
410 U.S. at 302-03.
Without further explanation, however, Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissenting opinion
in Chambers that "[w]ere [he] to reach the merits ... [he] would have considerable
difficulty in subscribing to the Court's further constitutionalization of the intricacies of the
common law of evidence." Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Note,
Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process and the Rules of Evidence, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 725
(1974).
2 The Second Circuit in Welcome followed Chambers in relying upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, rather than the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment, as authority for the reversal of a state criminal conviction. See Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973). This approach had previously been advocated by Justice
Harlan in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 93 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Justice
argued that the confrontation clause was "not well designed for taking into account the
numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence
S. ... The task is far more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments' commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be con-
ducted in accordance with due process of law." Id. at 96-97. Accord, California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Note, Chambers v. Mississippi:
Due Process and the Rule of Evidence, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rlv. 725 (1974).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
nesses testifying against him,43 the Welcome court's opinion is in
line with the general trend recognizing the importance of the latter
right." The concern of the judiciary for a defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses was recently reflected in Davis v. Alaska.45
There, the Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting the
admission into evidence of juvenile records, which the defendant
sought to utilize in order to show the possible bias of a prosecution
witness then on probation, violated the defendant's right under the
confrontation clause to cross-examine effectively the witness against
him.46 In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed that state evidence rules
will be subjected to constitutional scrutiny in order to assure the
rights of criminal defendants to cross-examine witnesses.47 Subse-
quent to Davis, the District Court for the District of Connecticut,
in Chesney v. Robinson,1s held that a state rule mandating secrecy
of grand jury proceedings must defer to the defendant's right of
confrontation. 9 These decisions seem to manifest a growing concern
with the protection of a defendant's 'right to cross-examine wit-
nesses. In both cases, the state interest in applying the evidentiary
rule at issue was arguably greater than that in Welcome; yet, in each
case the rule was subordinated to the defendant's constitutional
rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that where an evidentiary rule
which has as little support as the doctrine prohibiting impeachment
,5 In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that the rights provided
by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment are incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and therefore may not be infringed by state govern-
ments. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
" Under rule 607 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, "[t]he credibility of a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him." FED. R. Evm. 607. Although
these rules are not binding upon the state courts, at least one state has adopted the principle
enunciated in rule 607. See State v. Trost, 244 N.W.2d 556, 560 (Iowa 1976).
415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of
Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. REV.
1465 (1975).
" 415 U.S. at 320.
" See id. at 318. In State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. 1975), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that under Davis the evidentiary privilege associated with the physician-
patient relationship must yield to a criminal defendant's right of confrontation. In Hembd,
which involved a charge of false imprisonment, the court found that the exclusion of certain
medical records which would have weight to the defense violated the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment. Id. at 876.
11 403 F. Supp. 306 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 538 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
11 403 F. Supp. at 311. Specifically, the court in Chesney held that a rule prohibiting
impeachment of a prosecution witness by use of the witness' grand jury testimony violates
the defendant's right of confrontation. Id. at 310-11.
1978]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:275
of one's own witness"0 comes into conflict with a defendant's consti-
tutional right to cross-examine witnesses, the former principle
would be displaced by the weightier constitutional considerations.5'
The Second Circuit decision in Welcome reflects the recent
trend toward modification of state evidentiary rules to ensure con-
formity with constitutional provisions.52 While avoiding the outright
invalidation of evidentiary principles, the federal courts have
weighed the interests of the state against those of the defendant
5 3
and often required the state to bear a heavy burden in demonstrat-
ing that a particular rule of evidence serves a legitimate interest.
The Welcome holding thus adds to the growing body of decisions
addressing the problem of a constitutional standard for the applica-
tion of evidentiary rules. Whether such rules are measured against
the right to a fair trial or the right to confront witnesses, the devel-
opment of a constitutional standard should provide a framework
within which courts can fairly apply evidentiary rules in criminal
trials.
Julie H. Simpson
See note 2 supra.
" Even prior to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, at least two circuits
had concluded that the rule proscribing impeachment of one's own witness should not be
applied in federal criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 918-19 (6th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
958 (1963). In Freeman, the Second Circuit held that a witness may be impeached by the
party calling him irrespective of whether he is adverse or hostile to that party. Id. at 351.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Bryant rejected the notion that a witness must be adverse in
the traditional sense before he may be impeached by the party calling him, and instead
required a showing of hostility. 461 F.2d at 918.
At least one other court since Chambers has held that the denial of a defendant's right
to impeach his own witness in certain instances is alone sufficient to require reversal of a
criminal conviction. See United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1973). In Torres, the
Ninth Circuit reversed a federal conviction, finding that, by virtue of the trial court's refusal
to allow defense counsel to impeach his own witness where such impeachment was crucial to
the defense, defendant had not received a fair trial. Id. at 923.
52 See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
m In Chambers, the Supreme Court recognized that in certain instances a legitimate
state interest may outweigh a defendant's right to confrontation. Nonetheless, the denial of
the confrontation right, according to the Chambers Court, "calls into question the ultimate
'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing interest be closely
examined." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (quoting Berger v. California,
393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (per curiam)). Accord, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Mancusi
v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Chesney v. Robinson, 403 F. Supp. 306 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd
without opinion, 538 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
